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This paper discusses the eastward enlargement process of the EU
in the framework of a simple war of attrition bargaining game. Both
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while the EU prefers substantially reformed candidates. A waiting
game unfolds. Within this framework the present enlargement
round is analyzed and policy results are deduced. For example, it is
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11 Introduction
The eastward enlargement of the European Union promises vast beneﬁts for
the involved parties. Yet, within the enlargement process itself, tough bar-
gaining has taken place over ﬁnancing, free mobility of labor, market access
and the implementation of the acquis communautaire in general. These two
faces of eastward enlargement come as no surprise, because although the
overall beneﬁts seem patently obvious, the costs and beneﬁt of this historical
step are distributed unevenly (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (1997), Boeri et al.
(2000), Weise et al. (2001)). This paper discusses the enlargement bargaining
process within the simple framework of a war of attrition. Both parties – the
existing EU members and the applicant countries – beneﬁt from enlargement.
For the applicants full compliance with the acquis communautaire is costly,
hence they will attempt to achieve membership on less strict terms. The
present EU members, however, beneﬁt most from admitting substantially
reformed candidates, but would rather accept partially reformed countries
than postpone enlargement indeﬁnitely. A waiting game unfolds where the
players will attempt to send certain signals as to their preferences, delegate
decisions to ‘tough’ third parties, or try to display patience and indiﬀerence
with respect to the ﬁnal outcome, thus attempting to force their opponent
into compliance.
After the collapse of the old economic and political system in eastern Eu-
rope it became evident that membership in the EU was, at least, a mid-term
objective for many countries of the region. Since previous enlargements were
of a smaller scale, the EU – unprepared to handle immediate applications –
developed a formalised enlargement process. Following the initial Europe-
Agreements, which dealt with political, economic and cultural co-operation
and promotion of free trade, the EU clariﬁed the enlargement conditions
in the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. These conditions included items such
as compliance with the aims of a political and a monetary union, existence
of a functioning market economy and, in general, an implementation of the
acquis communautaire. These conditions were then followed up by regular
screenings conducted by the Commission, which ultimately evolved into the
actual enlargement negotiations (starting with the ﬁrst wave in 1998) that
have now been concluded for the ﬁrst ten applicants.
As the formal framework for our analysis of this ten year enlargement
process, we use a war of attrition waiting game. This game is won by the
player willing to wait the longest for his favorite outcome to materialise.
The applicant country attempts to be admitted with an only partially im-
plemented acquis communautaire or otherwise curtailed reforms in order to
minimize the costs of reform and adjustment. The EU endeavors to pressure
2the prospective applicants into complete and substantial reform in order to
maximise the beneﬁts from enlargement. Other papers employing a similar
approach – a war of attrition setting applied to national or international bar-
gaining situations over economic reforms – are those of Alesina and Drazen
(1991), who examine ﬁscal stabilisation; Perotti (1998), who studies ﬁnancial
sector reform in transition economies; and Heinemann (2000), who discusses
the strategic eﬀects of creating the EMU.
While the structure and dynamics of the accession process have been the
central focus in the political science literature1, the vast majority of the eco-
nomic literature2 on EU eastward enlargement focuses on the economic costs
and beneﬁts. The present paper combines elements of both approaches. We
categorise the bargaining process as a waiting game. Within this framework
we can study various bargaining strategies and episodes that the EU and
applicants have employed during the past ten years. In doing so we are able
to evaluate a priori the entry conditions of diﬀerent types of candidates. For
example, those applicants showing the most promise in terms of beneﬁts for
the existing members will enter on weaker conditions than applicants with
more at stake, i.e. applicants that have more to gain from membership. Or
countries where the public is tending to show less support for EU-membership
will – within our framework – be able to enter on more favorable (weaker
reform) terms. More importantly, within our framework, several of the ac-
tually employed bargaining devices of the incumbent EU member countries,
turn out to be eﬃcient negotiation strategies. Examples include the strat-
egy of committing and out-sourcing the formal evaluation of the candidates
reform status (i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria) to the Commission, and that of
evaluating the progress of each country individually without closing the door
(i.e. the ‘Regatta’-model). These are sensible devices with which the exist-
ing EU members can achieve their most favorite outcome in the enlargement
bargaining game.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple war
of attrition game as a framework for our analysis. Section 3 applies this
conceptual framework to an analysis of the past ten years of the enlargement
process. Section 4 concludes the paper.
1See for example Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002), Mattli and Plumper (2002),
Grabbe (2001) and (2002) but also – from a practicioners point of view – Mayhew (2000).
2See for example Baldwin et al. (1997), Breuss (1999), Kohler (2000), or, for the case
of the costs and beneﬁts of enlarging the CAP, Josling et al. (1998) and Tangermann and
Banse (2000).
32 A simple framework
Consider an EU applicant country, A, and the existing EU members, E, that
play a war of attrition type game to obtain enlargement. The incumbent EU
members can unilaterally decide on admitting a new member (enlargement
occurs). E has – in some initial step – outlined the reform requirements
for new members but is unable to enforce these reforms directly except by
postponing membership. The applicant decides to implement or not to im-
plement the acquis (required reforms). Both parties, A and E, beneﬁt from
enlargement. In the status quo – no membership and no reform – the payoﬀs
for both players are normalised to zero. Any change from the status quo re-
sults in the following present value payoﬀs, (which may or may not be known
to the parties): The gains to the existing EU members from admitting a new
country are α. The total costs from allowing an incompletely reformed coun-
try to enter are given by σ. The gains to the applicant, A, from the country
becoming an EU member are β. The present value of all costs that the appli-
cant faces when implementing complete reform in compliance with the entry
requirements – net of the beneﬁts that may stem from these reforms – is τ.
All parameters α,σ,β,τ > 0. The payoﬀ structure is summarised in Table 1.
EU
enlarge do not enlarge
fulﬁll β − τ , α −τ , 0
Applicant
do not fulﬁll β , α − σ 0 , 0
Table 1: The enlargement game (payoﬀs: A, E)
The sequence of the game is as follows:
• Step 0: E states membership requirements and opens enlargement round.
• Step 1: A choose to fulﬁll or not to fulﬁll the requirements.
• Step 2: E chooses to admit or postpone enlargement.
• Step 3: If enlargement is postponed the game is repeated with probabil-
ity 1−φ or ends with probability φ (payoﬀ zero). If enlargement
occurs, payoﬀs are realised and the game ends.
Thus the game ends – possibly after some periods of delay – with either
EU membership or with a “closing the door” situation, i.e. the risk that there
4will be no further enlargement rounds such that the status quo is maintained
indeﬁnitely (do not fulﬁll, do not enlarge). The probability φ (0 < φ < 1)
will be discussed as a policy parameter of the incumbent EU members. From
the sequence and payoﬀs of this game it immediately follows that once the
applicant has implemented the reform requirements, the EU’s best strategy
is to proceed with enlargement; thus the situation (step one: fulﬁll step two
do not enlarge) is not an equilibrium. In fact in the one-shot game with
α > σ enlarge is E’s dominant strategy and accordingly, the game would
end in the (do not fulﬁll, enlargement) equilibrium, regardless of β and τ. In
the remainder we assume α > σ and β > τ. 3
The dynamics of this setup emerge in the repeated version, where both
players have the power to end the game: the applicant by following through
with reforms and the EU by admitting a non-reformed applicant. Yet by not
reforming and postponing, the players may choose to wait and delay the game
in the hope that the other player will subsequently give up, thus allowing
their own favorite outcome to materialise. The EU’s favorite outcome is to
admit a reformed country (payoﬀ α) while the applicants’ favorite outcome
is to obtain membership without fulﬁlling the requirements (payoﬀ β). But
waiting is costly. Players discount the future. Payoﬀs realised in subsequent
periods are discounted at the rate of time preference ρj , j = A,E for the
applicant and the existing EU members respectively. This gives a discount
factor of
1−φ
1+ρj , j = A,E. Even though waiting is costly for both players,
they are each willing to wait a certain period of time hoping for the other
player to give up. The war of attrition is won by the player willing to wait
the longest for his favorite outcome to occur (see Bliss and Nalebuﬀ, 1984).
Maximum waiting times
Since the war of attrition is won by the player willing to forego his winning
payoﬀ longer than his opponent, the maximum waiting times must be estab-
lished. But even though agents are willing to wait there need not be any
delay. In eﬀect, given the use of pure strategies only and a situation of com-
plete information, there will be no substantial delay. Rather, the player who
realises that he will lose eventually will give up right away (harvesting his
losing payoﬀ) instead of enduring any delay and staying in the status quo,
(see Hendricks et al., 1988). On the other hand, in settings of incomplete
information, the game will feature some delay (Alesina and Drazen, 1991)
until the more patient agent has established his willingness to wait. what is
3In a one-shot version with α < σ and τ < β the game would end in the (do fulﬁll,
enlarge) equilibrium, while with α < σ and τ > β the game would persist in the status
quo (do not fulﬁll, do not enlarge).
5important for our analysis is to examine how the maximum waiting times of
the EU and the applicant country are aﬀected by the various parameters of
the model. The maximum waiting time, ¯ tE, of the EU is deﬁned by equat-







= α − σ . (1)
The right-hand side is simply the present value of giving up right away, i.e.
permitting an un-reformed applicant into the EU. On the left-hand side, we
have the present value to the EU of the applicant country giving in and
fulﬁlling the reform requirements (with membership resulting) at time ¯ tE.
From (1) the maximum waiting time of the EU is given by:











Fully parallel, the problem of the applicant country can be stated by






= β − τ . (3)
The left-hand side is the value of winning at time ¯ tA, while the right-hand
side is the value of giving up today, i.e. fulﬁlling the reform requirements
and becoming an EU member immediately. From (3) the maximum waiting
time of an applicant is:











Due to the sequential nature of the game, when the applicant country
plays ‘tough’ i.e. does not fulﬁll the reform requirements, then the EU,
if it decides to postpone the enlargement for the present round (punish the
applicant), can at best achieve its favorite outcome (admittance of a reformed
country) in the next enlargement round. Formally we can state:
Lemma 1. The EU wins the enlargement bargaining if ¯ tE > ¯ tA+1, resulting
in the applicant fulﬁlling the reform requirements and enlargement occurring.
The reasoning of lemma (1) is the common intuition behind the war of
attrition whereby the player that can establish that he is willing to wait longer
6than his opponent [either by demonstrating his ability to wait (incomplete
information) or because his ability to wait is known (complete information)]
wins the game. He does so because the other player – after recognizing the
other’s superior ability to hold out longer – maximises his payoﬀ by giving
up right away (see Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984), Alesina and Drazen (1991),
Hendricks et al. (1988)).
EU and applicant parameters
When diﬀerentiating ¯ tE and ¯ tA with respect to the gain, cost and time pref-
erence parameters of the two players, the standard war of attrition results
are obtained. Formally, for the maximum waiting time of the EU we can
state:
Proposition 1. The EU’s maximum waiting time ¯ tE increases, i.e. the
EU’s chances of winning – the applicant country implementing the reform
requirements and joining the EU – increase, when ceteris paribus:
i) the EU’s beneﬁts from EU enlargement, α, decrease
ii) the EU’s costs of admitting un-reformed countries, σ, increase
iii) the EU becomes more patient, i.e. ρE decreases
The derivatives of ¯ tE are presented in Appendix A.1. What proposition
1 says follows a clear intuition. If the EU is too eager to admit an applicant
into the club, it reduces its chances of being able to pressure for complete
fulﬁllment of the entry requirements. On the other hand, as the costs of
including members that are only partially reformed increase, the EU has a
stronger standing in the bargaining. Finally, patience – as always in the war
of attrition – is a good strategy for winning the game.
Next, the maximum waiting time of the applicant country can be exam-
ined in much the same fashion. The following parallel results can be stated:
Proposition 2. The applicant’s maximum waiting time ¯ tA increases, i.e.
the applicant’s chances of winning – the EU admitting the applicant without
having fulﬁlled the reform requirements – increase, when ceteris paribus:
i) the applicant’s beneﬁts from EU membership, β, decrease
ii) the applicant’s costs of implementing the required reforms, τ, increase
iii) the applicant becomes more patient, i.e. ρA decreases
7The derivatives of ¯ tA are presented in Appendix A.2. Proposition 2 also
displays a clear intuition. For example, applicants that beneﬁt signiﬁcantly
from EU membership can be more easily forced to fulﬁll all the reform re-
quirements set out. From propositions 1 and 2 and the framework in general,
we can deduce the following policy implications:
Policy implications – Part 1
The incumbent EU member states can strengthen their position in enlarge-
ment bargaining by
• delegating the evaluation of the reform progress and the decision on entry
to a third party,
• displaying patience (and not setting a ﬁrst-enlargement-wave deadline),
• emphasising the costs to the EU of admitting un-reformed countries,
• downplaying the beneﬁts of enlargement for the existing EU members,
• dampening and/or compensating the costs that implementation of reform
requirements imposes on the applicants,
• fostering and/or increasing the beneﬁts for new members,
An applicant can strengthen its position in enlargement bargaining by
• downplaying the beneﬁts from and the interest in EU membership,
• exaggerating the costs that the required reforms and demands of the EU
cause,
• displaying patience (and insisting on a ﬁrst-enlargement-wave deadline
prior to ¯ tE).
Extension: eﬀects of closing the door
Increasing or decreasing the probability that a postponed game is terminated,
i.e. altering the closing-the-door probability φ, aﬀects both ¯ tE and ¯ tA. In
order to make further inferences, one can summarise the basic reasoning of
lemma 1 by formulating the function f = ¯ tE−¯ tA−1, which for positive values
says that the EU is winning, and for negative values that the applicant is
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β−τ, become decisive for the sign of
∂f
∂φ. In particular
8the following result is obtained:
Proposition 3. An increase in the probability that the enlargement process
is closed, i.e. increasing φ
i) improves the bargaining position of the EU if the EU’s win-lose ratio
is smaller than the applicant’s win-lose ratio, i.e. the EU has less at
stake. Namely,
∂f




ii) worsens the bargaining position of the EU if the EU’s win-lose ratio
is larger than the applicant’s win-lose ratio, i.e. the EU has more at
stake. Namely,
∂f




For proof of this proposition see appendix A.3. The probability of closing
the door, φ, aﬀects both the EU’s and the applicant’s willingness to wait.
Hence, the intuitively expected case, where an increased probability of clos-
ing the door helps to discipline future members into compliance does not hold
for all constellations. In fact, if the EU haqd too much at stake (for example,
the win-lose ratio increases once the costs of admitting unprepared agents
increases, σ increases), then limiting the number of enlargement rounds may
harm the EU’s position. Consequently, following proposition 1 and the de-
rived policy implications, this implies that a strategy of claiming high costs
from admitting unprepared members (which implies a high EU win-lose ra-
tio) can only be a good negotiation strategy in combination with an open
(low φ) enlargement process. The inverse reasoning is also true when the ap-
plicant has much at stake (for example, the applicant’s win-lose ratio grows
as the cost of enlargement, τ, increases), then paradoxically a reduction in
the number of future round (lower φ) improves the applicant’s bargaining
position. Still in general, since it is reasonable to assume that the applicant
countries have more at stake than the existing EU members, our results in
proposition 3 show that a threat of closing the door does indeed improve the
position of the EU.
From the conceivable changes to the win-lose ratios and under the as-
sumption that the probability of terminating the enlargement process is a
decision parameter of the incumbent EU members, some further policy im-
plications can be derived:
9Policy implications – Part 2
The following combinations of policies strengthen the EU’s position in en-
largement bargaining :
• Claiming large beneﬁts from enlargement (high α) and limiting the num-
ber of enlargement rounds.
• Claiming high costs from admitting un-reformed applicants (high σ) and
increasing the number of enlargement rounds.
• Increasing the beneﬁts of membership for new members (high β) and
limiting the number of enlargement rounds.
• Imposing more costly reform requirements (high τ) and increasing the
number of enlargement rounds.
3 The enlargement process – strategies and
results
In the following, we will analyse the actual enlargement process in the light of
our war of attrition scenario using the policy implications derived in section 2.
As we will see, the actual development of the enlargement process throughout
the 90s corresponds nicely to the general framework of our model. However,
some of its limitations are also shown.
Main steps of the enlargement process
Soon after the collapse of the old economic and political system in the COME-
CON, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) began to make
closer relations with the European Union a key focus of their political en-
deavors. Membership in the EU quickly became at least a mid-term objective
of these countries. Until then, several enlargements of the EU had already
taken place – all of them of relatively small scope and under a quite general
legal framework.4 Thus, the EU assessed itself as being not fully prepared
to handle immediate applications of all possible would-be members. The
4In principle, any European country could apply for EU membership. The basic treaty
of the European Economic Community did not contain speciﬁc conditions. Only the
Amsterdam treaty revision of October 1997 deﬁned some explicit requirements. Article
49 of the EU-Treaty states that a European country might apply for membership in the
EU under the condition that it respects the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights
and basic freedoms as well as the rule of law.
10perceptions of the beneﬁts of n eventual EU membership for both sides and
of the conditions that might be attached to this were very unclear, or – in
terms of our model – the decisive parameters (α, β, σ and τ) were almost
completely unknown.
However, the structure of the problem as outlined in the previous section
was clear. Immediate accession was out of the question. In line with the
recommendations of the war of attrition framework, the EU pointed out
the problems of a premature membership of ill-prepared transition countries
and it showed patience. A step-by-step approach was developed to organise
the integration process in Europe (Mayhew (1998), European Commission
(2001), Grabbe (2002)).
First, the so-called Europe-Agreements were negotiated with the transi-
tion countries interested in EU membership. These agreements were designed
to enhance political, economic and cultural co-operation. Perhaps most im-
portantly, a gradual and asymmetric introduction of a free trade area was
included. The EU opened its borders more rapidly for the exports of the
CEECs than vice versa. With the exception of agriculture, trade was prac-
tically free by the end of the 90s. In addition to regular association treaties
with third countries, the EU acknowledged that the CEECs might be able
to become EU members at a later stage. The ﬁrst Europe-Agreements were
concluded in December 1991.
Second, the EU clariﬁed the conditions successful applicants would have
to fulﬁl. In more general terms, this was done by the heads of state and
government at the European Council of Copenhagen in June 1993. Appli-
cants would need to accept the basic aims of a political and a monetary
union. They would need to have a stable and democratic political system, a
functioning market economy capable of withstanding competition pressure in
the internal market and the willingness and ability to implement the acquis
communautaire, i.e. the EU laws and regulations. The EU member states
and the European Parliament were to decide on the individual applications.
The compilation of the detailed conditions (European Commission (1995)),
the monitoring of the candidates’ readiness and of the actual negotiations
was all ‘contracted’ out to a third party, the European Commission; as the
war of attrition framework would recommend.
Only after this were the ﬁrst applications for memberships accepted in
April 1994. The Commission carried out a ‘screening’ of the national laws
and regulations of each candidate and of their compatibility with EU law. It
started to produce annual reports on the progress of the candidates preparing
for membership (e.g. European Commission (2002)). Based on the results,
accession negotiations started with six candidate countries in March 1998
and with the remaining countries in February 2000. Referring to the loca-
11tion of the decisive summits, the ﬁrst group was christened the ‘Luxembourg
Group’ (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus)
and the second the ‘Helsinki-Group’ (Bulgaria, Romania, the Slovak Repub-
lic, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta). Turkey was acknowledged as an oﬃcial
candidate for membership but was considered not yet ready to start actual
negotiations. Thus the EU member governments always stressed that begin-
ning negotiations was no guarantee for their success, that each country would
be judged by its individual achievements and that, therefore, the problems
of any individual country would not delay the membership of more advanced
candidates. This was dubbed the ‘Regatta’-Model: everyone starts negotia-
tions under the same conditions; participants in the second wave could catch
up to those from the ﬁrst wave or even overtake them; nobody knows who
wins or whether everyone will reach the ﬁnish line; and everyone will move
at his own pace.
Characteristics of the negotiations
In emphasising the importance of the implementation of the acquis commu-
nautaire by all membership candidates, the EU acted pretty much as deduced
in Part 1 of the policy implications presented in Section 2.5 It accepted at
an early stage that the applicants deserved membership in principle but that
actual accession negotiations were not based on the idea of mutual beneﬁts
of enlargement. Enlargement was interpreted as a historical and political
obligation that could generate beneﬁts for old and new members if organ-
ised appropriately. The EU never allowed a ‘give-and-take’ negotiation to
develop, e.g. the applicants could not obtain any permanent exception from
the acquis because of any speciﬁc beneﬁts their membership would bring for
the old EU members. In establishing this position as the framework for en-
largement negotiations, the existing EU members showed extreme patience
and abstracted from their own beneﬁts from enlargement (their α). Hence,
the applicants were responsible for the adjustment process and, therefore, for
the duration of the enlargement process. This ﬁts closely with the eﬃcient
negotiation strategy deduced in Section 2.
However, the EU did not place the ﬁnancial adjustment burden solely on
the shoulders of the applicants (European Commission (2001), Weise (1996)).
5Given that the EU always rejected the theoretical option of ‘closing the door’, i.e. of
deﬁnitely blocking an applicant from membership once and for all, Part 2 of the policy
implications is less relevant here (see e.g. Prodi (2002)). Nevertheless, the need to get
accustomed to the new situation with 25 member states will, most certainly, delay the
next enlargement round. This, however, is diﬀerent from a permanent closing of the door
for Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey or the western Balkans.
12On the contrary, it lent substantial ﬁnancial and technical support to the
applicants in order to enable them to implement the acquis, i.e. reducing
the eﬀective τ for the applicants. Speciﬁc payments started with some 0.4
bn. ECU in 1990 and reached 3.3 bn. euro in 2001. Initially these support
payments were meant to help the transition countries in the restructuring of
their economies in general. Throughout the 90s, they were more and more
targeted at supporting introducing community laws and regulations.
Parallel to the accession negotiations, the EU also widened the beneﬁts
the applicants could expect from membership, i.e. increasing β. The most
signiﬁcant example of this is the treatment of the direct income support
payments, the most important element of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). These were invented in the early 90s as a compensation for a reduc-
tion in artiﬁcial price support mechanisms that became necessary due to the
GATT Uruguay Round. As there were no such price supports in the candi-
date countries, and therefore no such reductions, the EU decided in 1999 that
these compensation payments were not to be introduced in the new member
states (Europen Council (1999)). This view was challenged immediately by
the candidate countries and other critics because the EC Treaty prohibits
unequal treatment of any economic agent solely due to his nationality. In
the ﬁnal stage of accession negotiations, the EU changed its position and
agreed to a gradual phasing in of these subsidies in the new member states
(European Council (2002)). Eventually this will mean an additional approx.
5 bn. euro per year from EU coﬀers for the new members.
As deduced from our model in the policy implications of Section 2, by
developing this bargaining strategy, the EU member states built up a very
strong position in the accession negotiations. They delegated important parts
of the process to an independent third party. They displayed patience and
did not set any deadline for accession. They emphasised the importance of
new members implementing the acquis and refused to accept any changes
to the accession criteria because of enlargement beneﬁts to the ‘old’ EU. In
addition, they supported the applicants in the implementation of EU law
and they increased the potential beneﬁts of membership in the course of the
negotiations. The ﬁrst results of the accession negotiations demonstrated the
credibility and consistency of the EU approach. While the EU assumed in
1999 as a ‘technical hypothesis’ that the six countries of the Luxembourg
Group might join in 2002 and no one else before 2007, the actual ﬁrst en-
largement round is now scheduled to consist of four additional countries but
will take place in May 2004. This shows a credible commitment to patience
on the one hand and to the ‘regatta’ model on the other: six countries had to
wait longer than planned because they were not deemed ready soon enough,
but the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta were more successful
13than envisaged in the Agenda 2000, and thus admitted sooner.
While this picture is dominated by a strong EU, we can also identify two
major examples of successes of applicants in speciﬁc topics. Both ﬁt well
into our formal framework because they were achieved due to downplaying
the beneﬁts from and interest in EU membership and by exaggerating the
costs of accepting the demands of the EU. The ﬁrst example is related to
the EU proposal to limit the free migration of labour in the initial years
of membership. The candidates seized the opportunity to emphasise the
high costs of accepting any deviation from the acquis in this area. Finally,
they coupled the issue successfully with their demand to obtain very long
transition periods before accepting the right of EU foreigners to own land
in the applicant countries. The second example is the already mentioned
topic of direct income support payments. The applicants emphasised the
importance of equal treatment and substantial subsidies for their agricultural
sector especially with reference to the referenda that will have to take place
before the accession treaties can come into force. In eﬀect, they successfully
downplayed all other beneﬁts of membership apart from agricultural subsidies
(claiming a low β) and highlighted the national political costs of not getting
these payments (claiming a high τ).
Limitations of the approach
While the war of attrition model has some explanatory relevance for the
actual accession negotiations, in particular with respect to a strong and suc-
cessful position of the EU, there are also important limitations of the model
and hence reasons for a more sceptical assessment of the EU approach.
First of all, from the point of view of smaller and/or well-advanced transi-
tion countries like Hungary or Slovenia, the equal treatment of all applicants
that was implied by the ‘regatta’ model was never very convincing. These
countries felt ready for membership relatively early and saw themselves as
being forced to wait for suﬃcient progress of Poland (e.g. Inotai (2001)),
which was for political and historical reasons the most important candidate
but also caused severe problems in the accession process, partly because it is
the most populous new member.
Second, from a more theoretical perspective, the assumed degree of infor-
mation in our model might be problematic. On the one hand, the assumed
degree of information is too low. The governments of the EU member states
have to downplay beneﬁts from enlargement vis-` a-vis the applicants but they
have to emphasise them vis-` a-vis their own population. This makes it very
diﬃcult to maintain a consistent communication strategy. On the other hand,
the assumed degree of information is too high. The actual beneﬁts from en-
14largement are very hard to quantify. From an economic point of view, the
most important aspect probably is a pro-competitive eﬀect in the wake of
closer economic integration, but this might be diﬃcult to be viewed as a
beneﬁt by non-economists among the EU population.
Third, the EU always refused to couple enlargement with the internal
reform debate. This was appropriate in order to achieve smooth accession
negotiations. However, the EU risks being more poorly prepared for enlarge-
ment than the applicants, because necessary improvements in the budget-
relevant policies and institutions and the decision-making process still have
not taken place (e.g. Baldwin et al. (2000), Br¨ ucker and Weise (2002), Brusis
and Emmanouilidis (2002) and Siebert (2002)).
4 Conclusion
The paper employs a simple war of attrition framework to examine the bar-
gaining process of EU eastward enlargement. Thus we categorise the enlarge-
ment bargaining process as a waiting game. Both players – the current EU
members and the applicants – beneﬁt from enlargement, yet for the appli-
cants, reform according to the acquis is costly, while the EU prefers to admit
substantially reformed candidates.
Within this formal framework, we study and explain a number of bargain-
ing strategies and episodes that have been observed during the past ten years
of negotiations. First, the strategy of out-sourceing the formal evaluation of
the candidates’ reform status (i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria) to the Commis-
sion is, within the bargaining framework presented here, a useful strategy for
the current EU members, and produces a clear bargaining advantage. Sec-
ond, to evaluate the progress of each country individually without closing the
door is, within our framework, a sensible strategy for the existing EU mem-
bers. Third, compensating the applicant countries for their reform eﬀorts
again strengthens the current EU members’ negotiation positions. Fourth,
increasing the beneﬁts to the applicants as well as, ﬁfth, excluding the option
of changing the acquis in the negotiations again strengthens the bargaining
position of the existing members. Finally, these reasonings also apply the
other way around. In particular, applicant countries where the public’s en-
thusiasm for EU-membership is declining will – within the formal framework
– be able to enter on more favorable (weaker reform) terms. Similarly, ex-
aggerating the costs that the required reforms cause, and downplaying the
beneﬁts of a membership are eﬃcient negotiation strategies. Applicants have
indeed strengthened their position in the negotiations by downplaying their
beneﬁts and their interest in EU membership and by exaggerating the costs
15of complying with certain EU demands, i.e. in the ﬁeld of the CAP.
16A Appendix
A.1 Derivatives in Proposition 1
Derivatives of the EU’s maximum waiting time. Diﬀerentiating ¯ tE given in












which is negative, since the ﬁrst term is positive and the second term is
negative (
1−φ
1+ρE < 1). Hence,
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which is positive, since both the ﬁrst term and the second term are negative.
Hence,
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which is negative, since the numerator is negative (α−σ
α < 1), while the
denominator is positive. Hence,
∂¯ tE
∂ρE < 0.
A.2 Derivatives in Proposition 2
Fully parallel to Appendix A.1 the derivatives of the applicant’s maximum
waiting time can be stated. Diﬀerentiating ¯ tA given in (4) in the main text












which is negative, since the ﬁrst term is positive and the second term is
negative (
1−φ
1+ρA < 1). Hence,
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which is positive, since both the ﬁrst term and the second term are negative.
Hence,
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17which is negative, since the numerator is negative (
β−τ
β < 1), while the




Diﬀerentiating f given in (5) in the main text with respect to the closing the
























Setting ρE = ρA = ρ the sign of the derivative depends on the numerators in
the two terms. Rewriting gives:
∂f
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